The EU-25 Fiscal Compact : differentiated spillover effects under crisis conditions. by Schweiger,  Christian
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
12 June 2014
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Schweiger, Christian (2014) 'The EU-25 Fiscal Compact : diﬀerentiated spillover eﬀects under crisis
conditions.', Perspectives on European politics and society., 15 (3). pp. 293-304.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15705854.2014.912398
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor Francis Group in Perspectives on European Politics
and Society on 07/05/2014, available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/15705854.2014.912398.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Perspectives on 
European Politics and Society on 28 May 2014, available online: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15705854.2014.912398#.U5XBMXJd
U1I,  
 
The EU-25 Fiscal Compact: Differentiated spillover effects under crisis conditions 
 
Christian Schweiger 
School of Government and International Affairs 
Durham University 
South End House, South Road 
Durham DH1 3TG 
United Kingdom 
Email: christian.schweiger@durham.ac.uk 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This article analyses the intergovernmental Fiscal Compact, which represents the latest 
layer in the emerging new governance framework EU governments have adopted in 
response to the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. The crisis has initiated a new wave of 
selective functionalist spillover towards noticeably different levels of policy coordination 
between the eurozone-18 core and the remaining EU member states, who are divided into 
a semi-periphery and an outer periphery group. As an intergovernmental contract with 
currently 25 EU member states the Fiscal Compact signifies the decline of the traditional 
Community method of universal supranational integration in favour of a more 
differentiated form of intergovernmental policy coordination between groups of member 
states. 
_____________ 
KEYWORDS: Differentiated integration, eurozone crisis, neofunctionalism,  
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The 2008-09 global financial crisis severely affected the economies of the eurozone, 
particularly those of Southern Europe. The collapse of major US financial institutions 
such as Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae and Lehman Brothers had profound ripple effects on 
the economies of Ireland and Greece who suffered sudden drastic liquidity problems in 
the course of 2009. The same year markets became increasingly shaky about the 
stability of other eurozone economies, which raised questions about the long-term 
stability of the single currency. In March 2010 the European Union lead by an initially 
reluctant Germany responded with the initiation of the new annual cycle of policy 
coordination under the post-Lisbon Europe 2020 Strategy. This was followed by a Euro 
Plus Pact in spring 2011, which established enhanced policy coordination between the 
eurozone and six outsiders. At the EU summit in Brussels in December 2011 German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel and French president Nicholas Sarkozy went one step further 
and suggested a new treaty which would require member states to determine a fiscal 
spending brake in their national constitutions. This plan was rejected by the British 
prime minister David Cameron who argued that 'what is on offer isn't in Britain's 
interests' on the basis that he could not accept a 'treaty within a treaty' which would 
ultimately affect Britain's sovereign economic policy-making (Traynor, Watt, Gow and 
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Wintour 2012). Cameron had made his agreement on the inclusion of the treaty in the 
EU's acquis dependent on the inclusion of a protocol in which would guarantee Britain 
safeguards against an expansion of EU regulatory powers over Britain's financial 
services sector(Grant 2011).  
The British veto against the Franco-German desire to instil budgetary stability in the EU 
treaty structure represents a significant development for the future of the EU. In effect it 
decouples Britain and currently also the Czech Republic from the emerging deepening 
policy coordination between the eurozone core and the outside periphery of non-euro 
members. The countries who signed up to the Euro Plus Pact (Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia 
Lithuania, Poland and Romania) therefore emerged as the new semi-periphery which is 
closely associated to the deepening policy coordination in the eurozone-18 core. Latvia 
has in the meantime left the EPP and become a full member of the eurozone. The semi-
periphery includes Hungary and Sweden, who are both not part of the EPP but 
nevertheless signatories of the March 2012 intergovernmental Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance ('Fiscal Compact') which came into effect on 1 January 
2013.  Britain and the Czech Republic, who both opted out from the EPP and the Fiscal 
Compact currently represent the outer fringe of the EU’s periphery. 
 
 
The institutional failures of EMU 
 
The divisions which emerged amongst EU member states with regard to the 
participation in the different layers of policy coordination illustrate the limitations of 
the classic Community method of integration. This has been evident for some time, most 
noticeably in the fact that Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 2002 had created a 
group of countries who voluntarily agreed to transfer the control over their monetary 
policy to the newly established supranational European Central Bank. The group of 
eurozone countries hence had moved further than those on the outside whose pooling 
of national sovereignty remained limited to the areas of binding Single Market 
legislation and limited areas of judicial and police cooperation. The emerging eurozone 
had clearly become the core project of the EU. It was widely expected that policy 
coordination would be extended to further areas such as employment policy, education, 
welfare and taxation and could even result in at least partial harmonisation in these 
areas (Hantrais 2007, p. 26). In reality the member states of the eurozone remained 
reluctant to accompany monetary union with deeper economic policy integration 
beyond the liberalisation agenda of the internal market. What was branded as a project 
which would combine monetary integration with the gradual binding coordination of 
core economic policy areas essentially ended up as a currency union with a set of 
budgetary rules which were after all interpreted in an extremely flexible manner. The 
original design of EMU consequently suffered from the fundamental flaw of taking away 
control over monetary policy from member states whilst practically failing to exercise 
an effective supervision of budgetary spending and a binding coordination of crucial 
policy areas such as wages, taxes and welfare (McCann 2010: 36). The adoption of the 
open method of coordination under the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 and its revised version 
in 2005 determined a set of targets which member states were expected to meet by 
engaging in a system of mutual policy learning under the OMC. The strategy essentially 
relied on the willingness of national governments to engage in best-practice 
benchmarking on the basis of peer pressure through a system which limited sanctions 
to being named and shamed in progress reports. In practice this resulted in insufficient 
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progress towards national policy coordination and most significantly in the persistence 
of stark differences in the overall performance of member states in the policy areas 
which were operated under the OMC (Hodson 2010: 173). 
 
Philippe C. Schmitter has repeatedly argued that over time the spillover towards deeper 
integration did not emerge on the basis of internal pressures (such as demands by 
existing supranational actors to expand their powers) but in fact were caused by 
external factors: ‘Much of what has happened since the mid-1970s can be better 
attributed to external trends and shocks than to purely internal processes and 
functional engrenages’ (Schmitter 1996a: 13). Schmitter’s interpretation of 
neofunctionalism also rejected the initial assumption made by Haas that spillover would 
ultimately take a linear progression of the transfer of powers from the national towards 
the supranational institutional level. Instead Schmitter spoke of the likelihood that the 
European integration process would progress erratically. In practice this would boil 
down to the direction of the integration process remaining multidirectional. Haas later 
followed Schmitter by adopting a more fine-tuned neofunctionalist approach in which 
he acknowledged that political actors in most cases fail to pursue a strategic long-term 
vision. Instead they would ‘stumble from one set of decisions into the next as a result of 
not having been able to foresee many of the implications and consequences of the 
earlier decisions’ (Haas 1970, p. 627). As a result, Community institutions and policies 
emerge incrementally and involve many twists and turns.  From the perspective of 
Schmitter this included the possibility of the return of powers from the Community 
towards the national level (‘spillback’). Most importantly for the analysis of the EU’s 
current situation, Schmitter anticipated the likelihood that political elites would decide 
to adapt existing Community policies and institutions to new challenges (‘encapsulate’) 
rather than to follow a quasi automatic progression towards deeper integration 
(Schmitter 1970: 846). Schmitter also considered the post-Maastricht era to be much 
more likely to be characterised by a more flexible form of integration:  
 
 ‘For the MAT [Maastricht Treaty] opens the way for a multitude of relatively 
 independent European arrangements with distinct statutes, functions, 
 resources and memberships, not coordinated by a single central organization 
 and operating under different decision rules’  (Schmitter 1996b) 
 
The creation of Economic and Monetary Union seemed to prove Haas’s original 
neofunctionalist approach right.  Under the budgetary limits set in the EMU Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) member states had initiated a process were the transfer of their 
national sovereignty in the area of monetary policy to the European Central Bank would 
be accompanied by an increasing intrusion of the EU into national fiscal policies (Börzel 
2006, p. 224). The reality turned out be starkly different. In practice the SGP turned out 
to be a soft gentleman's agreement which was de facto operated under the same open 
method of cooperation as other policy areas such as employment, education and 
environmental policy under the Lisbon Strategy (Borrás and Jacobsson 2004, p. 193). 
Member state governments were consequently given substantial leeway in arguing 
against the execution of financial penalties under the excessive deficit procedure. This 
occurred most prominently when the European Commission dealt with the fact that 
France and Germany were unable to abide by the three per cent spending limit to 
annual borrowing and the 60 per cent limit to the structural deficit (both in relation to a 
country’s annual GDP). In 2002 both countries started to breach the first criteria and 
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continuously did so until 2005. By 2003 they also had started to exceed the 60 per cent 
limit of structural debt but nevertheless in both cases no proper excessive deficit 
procedure was initiated (Hay and Wincott 2012, p. 158). The background to this was 
that the European Commission under the leadership of former Italian prime minister 
and economics professor Romano Prodi adopted a very relaxed attitude towards the 
practical implementation of the SGP budgetary rules. Prodi himself had famously 
denounced the pact as 'stupid' and a straightjacket in an article in the Le Monde 
newspaper published on 17 October 2002 (Osborn 2002).  
 
The widespread perception was therefore that the SGP failed to instil the fiscal rigidity 
it was supposed to deliver (Wyplosz, Nickell and Wolf 2006, p. 231). Instead budgetary 
laxity prevailed and those countries in the Southern periphery of the eurozone who 
entered the eurozone with existing structural deficit problems (such as Italy and 
Greece) made little efforts to rectify them. Rather than to be pushed towards fiscal 
consolidation by the supposed institutional constraints of the SGP, membership of the 
eurozone created a free rider syndrome. This manifested itself in additional layer of 
security for countries with budgetary imbalances who assumed that the eurozone 
countries would collectively  come to their rescue if their fiscal position worsened 
rather than to risk the overall stability or even the collapse of the eurozone. Figure 1 
illustrates this free rider problem as it shows that amongst the founding members of the 
eurozone Belgium, Greece, Italy and even Austria consistently maintained a level of 
gross debt which exceed 60 per cent of the national GDP between 1999 and 2006. From 
2003 they were joined by France, Germany and Portugal. In the case of Belgium, Greece 
and Italy the levels of gross structural debt consistently ranged between 90 and 110 per 
cent of the national GDP.  Italy never managed to lower the debt level below 100 per 
cent without facing any consequences under the excessive deficit procedure. 
 
Figure 1: General government gross debt (% of GDP) in the Eurozone 12,  
                    1999-2006 
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Source: EUROSTAT. Available at  
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/graph.do?tab=graph&plugin=1&pcode=tsdde41
0&language=en&toolbox=data (accessed 27 February 2014). 
 
 
The Fiscal Compact and the new phase of political spillover 
 
On 2 March 2012 the 17 countries of the eurozone plus eight new member states signed 
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
Union which has since been more informally referred to as the 'Fiscal Compact'. The 
German chancellor Angela Merkel had intended to incorporate the compact into the 
EU's existing treaty structure. The purpose of this was to establish it as a foundation for 
the stronger coordination of fiscal and macroeconomic policies in the eurozone but also 
to link the latter with those EU member states who have not adopted the euro. It was 
Merkel's and Sarkozy's joint aspiration that the constitutional embedment of a debt 
brake on the national level would be more acceptable to member states than moves to 
expand the powers of the Commission to influence domestic budgetary decision-
making:  
 
 In the face of the non-existing budgetary competence of the European 
 Commission the inherent link of the debt rule with national law is best 
 suited to make it compulsory for all of us ... I therefore believe that it is the 
 biggest sanction to be condemned in your own country (Merkel and Sarkozy  
              2011). 
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British prime minister David Cameron was not convinced of this argument and moved 
to veto the incorporation of the treaty into the EU's acquis because of his refusal to 
agree towards the deepening of political integration beyond the eurozone core. The 
Fiscal Compact therefore ended up as an intergovernmental treaty between 25 of the 
member states, with the UK and the Czech Republic remaining on the outside. David 
Cameron tried to justified his veto against the Fiscal Compact to become a binding 
treaty for all EU member states by arguing that from his perspective the content of the 
treaty represents a decisive step towards the long-term goal of a European political 
federation, which he believes should be limited to the eurozone:  
 
 Those of us outside the euro recognise that those in it are likely to need to make 
 some big institutional changes. By the same token, the members of the eurozone 
 should accept that we, and indeed all member states, will have changes that we 
 need to safeguard our interests and strengthen democratic legitimacy (Cameron  
 2013). 
 
 
Cameron’s veto has to be considered in the context of the origins of the policy 
mechanisms which emerged in response to the eurozone sovereign debt crisis. It is 
obvious that these mechanisms are not part of a long-term visionary strategy for the 
future institutional shape of the EU. Instead they emerged on the basis of relatively ad 
hoc reactions to worsening economic circumstances in the eurozone and resulting 
adverse market reaction. This is illustrated by the German approach during the 
eurozone crisis, which was characterised by a hesitant and slow acceptance of the need 
to take a leading role in shaping a collective EU response to the crisis. In the initial 
stages of the emerging sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone Merkel did not share the 
view of British prime minister Gordon Brown and French president Sarkozy who both 
called for the EU to address the crisis collectively. Brown, who was struggling to bring a 
deepening banking crisis under control in the course of 2008, spearheaded calls for a 
collective EU strategy. Brown voiced his frustrations with the attitude of other EU 
leaders, most of all Merkel, who he considered to be in denial about the true scale of the 
emerging crisis:  
 
 I sensed that most of Europe still considered the problem an essentially 
 American one, even in spite of everything that was happening across Europe (...) 
 I argued that European banks were more highly leveraged than banks in the US, 
 and I argued that concerted European Union action was vital (Brown 2010 , pp.  
 52-53). 
 
Sarkozy quickly moved to support Brown in this endeavour and started to publicly 
distance himself from Merkel’s reluctance to consider EU for the ailing economies of 
Ireland and Greece in the form of recapitalisation or stimulus programmes. During the 
joint press conference with Merkel in November 2008, Sarkozy stunned the assembled 
journalists when he stated that France under his leadership was working on the crisis 
while Germany would remain in a deliberative position (Sarkozy and Merkel 2008). In 
the course of 2009 Merkel was forced to change her stance as the worsening economic 
and budgetary situation in Ireland and particularly in Greece risked threatening to 
undermine the future of the euro. As markets started to downgrade eurozone 
economies, beginning with the lowering of Greece’s credit rating by the 
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Standard&Poor’s rating agency in October 2009, the risk that the debt crisis would 
affect further eurozone countries became obvious. As a result Merkel started to warm 
towards collective European action which followed in a gradual process from the 
Europe 2020 Strategy in 2010 towards the Fiscal Compact in 2012. This slow adaptation 
by Angela Merkel to the expectation that Germany was expected to take leadership was 
widely described as a ‘reluctant hegemon’ approach (Paterson 2011: 73). The Polish 
foreign minister Radek Sikorski aptly hinted at this when he reminded Merkel during 
his visit in Berlin in November 2011 that particularly Germany’s partners in the Eastern 
part of the EU expected an active German role under the crisis conditions. In Sikorski’s 
own words: ‘I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity. 
You have become Europe’s indispensable nation’ (Sikorski 2011: 9) 
 
The Fiscal Compact which emerged from the ongoing negotiations on the reform of the 
eurozone Stability and Growth pact since 2010, illustrates that the EU has been affected 
by a new and unprecedented wave of functionalist spillover as a result of unprecedented 
and severe external circumstances. In this respect it has to be emphasised that the 
spillover which occurred since the onset of the sovereign debt crisis is different from 
previous waves in two ways. Firstly it is caused by external pressures which 
empowered non-governmental actors at the expense of governing elites. Secondly the 
spillover that occurred signifies a break with the classic Community method of 
integration which was orientated towards the goal of collectivising increasing policy 
areas. 
 
I will address each of these characteristics individually. The first characteristic of the 
new wave of spillover is that its main driver was an exceptional external event in the 
form of the global financial crisis, which subsequently strengthened market forces at the 
expense of political decision-makers. This caused the, albeit reluctant, realisation 
amongst EU leaders that they had to rectify their initial failure to accompany monetary 
union with fiscal and economic policy coordination in order to regain market confidence 
and to re-establish at least a certain degree of political control over emerging events. 
This is in line with what revised neofunctionalist approaches considered to be one of 
the likely causes of integrative pressures towards political spillover, namely 
‘internationally induced incentives drive or reinforce the rationale for seeking 
supranational solutions’ (Schmitter and Niemann 2009: 59).  With the onset of the 
sovereign debt crisis in individual eurozone economies, bond markets and rating 
agencies started to become the key players in determining the prospects for economic 
recovery in the eurozone. Germany as the strongest economic and political player in the 
EU therefore reluctantly accepted the need to push towards binding policy coordination 
with the purpose of restoring market confidence and regaining political control in the 
eurozone.  The crisis forced political leaders in the eurozone to abandon the informal 
consensus upon which they had operated the eurozone since its creation in 2002. This 
consensus rested on the assumption that the completion of monetary union with the 
transfer of monetary sovereignty to the European Central Bank would not require 
further steps towards binding policy coordination or even harmonisation. In practice 
this was reflected by the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact towards greater 
flexibility in 2005, only two years before the financial crisis harshly revealed the 
inefficiencies of the pact. Under the reforms the eurozone members allowed 
significantly more room for member states to put forward political reasons for breaking 
the budgetary limits and in essence therefore contributed towards a '(re)politicisation 
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of fiscal relations' (Paudyn 2011:  2207). The Fiscal Compact represents a first 
significant step in moving away from the coordinative practical operation of the SGP 
and to introduce a system of binding budgetary supervision and fiscal responsibility. 
This was clearly Merkel's priority who rejected proposals to swiftly move towards 
further policy harmonisation in the eurozone. The prime example for this was Merkel’s 
refusal to accept the introduction of Eurobonds which would naturally come with a 
more political role for the European Central Bank in independently supporting crisis 
economies (Hübner  2012: 174). Merkel considers the Fiscal Compact as a move 
towards restoring market confidence in the eurozone and ensuring the long term 
stability of the European Union by turning it into a 'stability union'. In her official 
declaration on the Fiscal Compact in the German parliament on 29 June 2012 Merkel 
emphasised that the purpose of the treaty was to learn the lessons from the failure to 
exercise efficient supervision and control over national budgets under the pre-crisis 
SGP: 
 
 If the European sovereign debt crisis has shown us something than it is that the 
 irresponsible fiscal policy of one euro country can endanger the financial  
 stability of the whole eurozone. We have to put a halt to this (....) With the Fiscal 
 Compact national governments and national parliaments connect themselves in 
 an unprecedented fashion in order to transform Economic and Monetary Union 
 into a stability union (Merkel 2012). 
 
The fact that Merkel speaks of a ‘stability union’ rather than a federal union illustrates 
that she pursues a strategy of deepening intergovernmental policy coordination rather 
than to advocate the complete supranationalisation of further policy areas which would 
inevitably result in substantially enhanced independent regulatory powers for the EU 
institutional level.  In spite of the British veto Merkel clearly has not abandoned her 
ambition to make the provisions of the Fiscal Compact binding for all 28 EU member 
states. Merkel emphasised in her address to the German Bundestag that this should 
happen 'whenever it becomes possible' (Ibid). This shows that she is adamant to ensure 
that budgetary stability is instilled not just in the eurozone but in the economies across 
the whole of the Single European Market.  In terms of the future institutional shape of 
the EU and the eurozone Merkel however adopts a far more cautious approach and does 
not advocate the supranationalisation of further policy areas. Instead she promotes the 
deepening of binding intergovernmental policy coordination in further core economic 
policy areas. In an interview with the German weekly DER SPIEGEL which accompanied 
the ratification of the Fiscal Compact in the German parliament, Merkel laid out her 
rather pragmatic approach towards the future shape of the EU which she presented as a 
shared Franco-German vision: 
 
 At this stage I do not see the necessity to transfer further competences to the 
 Commission in Brussels. President François Hollande and I rather want a better 
 coordination of policy areas which are crucial for our competitiveness. We are  
 for example thinking of employment and pension policy but also taxation and 
 social policy. Economic policy coordination in Europe is far too weak, it needs to 
 be strengthened, which is different from  giving more competences to the  
 Commission (Merkel 2012, p. 30). 
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This shows that the political spillover that has occurred in the EU since the onset of the 
crisis leads to a more differentiated outcome in terms of both vertical and horizontal 
integration than previous developments, where binding supranationalisation for all 
member states was usually the desired outcome. The pressures exercised by financial 
markets on political actors have to this date resulted in only limited institutionalisation 
and creation of new supranational bodies such as the European Stability Mechanism. 
Instead member states governments have in effect continued to pursue a slight 
modification of a strategy which Schmitter characterised as ‘encapsulation’ in his early 
revision of Haas’s original neofunctionalist approach. Schmitter defined this as a 
strategy by political elites ‘to a respond to crisis by marginal modifications within the 
zone of indifference’ (Schmitter 1970, p. 846). ‘Encapsulation’ is essentially the 
reluctance to radically alter the existing institutional setup in a given policy area beyond 
a certain integrative point. Schmitter considered this to be generally the default 
approach, especially in areas where ‘actors adopt ever more divergent policies’ and 
‘new initiatives in scope and level are likely to be very risky and contentious’ (Ibid: 
867). This approach was very obvious in the design of the eurozone before the crisis, 
where member states prioritised the protection of the competitive advantage of their 
domestic economies over the stability of the single currency, The resulting regulatory 
framework consequently favoured preserving national policy-making autonomy (Hall 
2012: 357). Encapsulation was less visible in the horizontal dimension as even during 
the crisis period the eurozone has continued to enlarge to new member states. Between 
2007 and 2014 the eurozone adopted six new member states (Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, 
Slovakia, Estonia and most recently Latvia). 
 
The essential question is to what extent the new policy mechanisms in the EU and the 
eurozone will remain within or alternatively move beyond a state of relative 
encapsulation, i.e. the pursuing a strategy of ‘stable self-maintenance’ (Schmitter 1970: 
844), both in vertical and horizontal terms. The Fiscal Compact signifies a crucial 
development in this respect. At least to a certain extent the treaty shows the political 
willingness to move beyond encapsulation by deepening vertical policy coordination 
within the eurozone while at the same time attempting to maintain its horizontal 
openness towards the ten outsiders. 
 
The Compact nevertheless also significantly reflects the current political reality within 
the EU, where even the external pressures under crisis conditions have not substantially 
weakened member state resistance against giving up their sovereignty in key policy 
areas. The treaty hence pursues the twofold ambition of combining ‘ever-closer policy 
coordination in the euro area’ with the promotion of ‘conditions for stronger economic 
growth’ in the EU as a whole (European Council 2012: 1). The overall purpose is to 
ensure the long-term stability of the eurozone by instilling fiscal responsibility amongst 
the participating member states. This is reflected by the fact that the ‘balanced budget 
rule’ in article 3 of the treaty of limiting the structural deficit to 0.5 per cent of the 
national GDP at market prices (Ibid: 11), which all signatories are expected to 
implement in their domestic constitutional legal framework, is practically only binding 
for the eurozone countries. Under the provisions of the treaty the latter are subjected to 
the new system of reverse qualified majority. The Commission is therefore permitted to 
initiate an excessive deficit procedure against any eurozone country who is considered 
to be in breach of the golden budget rule and the SGP limits without having to consult 
the Council first. The Council can only stop this process by a qualified majority. It is only 
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eurozone countries who eventually face a potential financial penalty of a maximum of 
0.1 per cent of the national GDP if the European Court of Justice agrees with the 
Commission that a case of non-compliance exists (Ibid, article 8, paragraph 2, p. 16). In 
spite of the strengthening of the Commission’s independent supervisory powers under 
the provisions of the treaty, it also sets clear limitations and stops far short from 
equipping the Commission with executive competences beyond ensuring the 
compliance with the budgetary rules in the eurozone. The treaty emphasises that any 
corrective measures for member states deemed in breached of these rules by the 
Commission ‘shall fully respect the prerogatives of national parliaments’ (Ibid, article 3, 
paragraph 2, p.12). The 
 
The treaty provides the legal basis for the intended compulsory supervision and 
coordination of national policies within the eurozone and also amongst the aspiring 
members on the outside. It remains vague on which policy areas should fall under this 
coordination other than to state that economic policy coordination should take place in 
‘all the areas which are essential to the proper functioning of the euro area in pursuit of 
the objectives of fostering competitiveness, promoting employment, contributing 
further to the sustainability of public finances and reinforcing financial stability’ (Ibid,  
article 9, p. 17). The intention to improve the horizontal link between the eurozone core 
and the outside periphery is clearly visible in the fact that the treaty is deliberately open 
towards the inclusion of new signatories (Ibid, article 15, p. 23). Most importantly the 
treaty also guarantees all signatories who are currently not in the eurozone full 
participation in the euro summit meetings and the right to contribute to the 
institutional design of the eurozone (Ibid, article 12, p. 20). 
 
Beyond the Fiscal Compact: Towards differentiated encapsulation or further 
spillover? 
 
Until the plans for a eurozone banking union are put into concrete action, the Fiscal 
Compact remains the temporarily final step towards deeper policy coordination in 
response to the effects of the global financial crisis. In spite of the rather limited 
provisions of the treaty when it comes to constraining national policy autonomy, it has 
pushed two member states, who refused to subject themselves to its rules, into an outer 
periphery position. Both the British and Czech government opted out of the treaty due 
to concerns about of it potentially representing a first step towards the federalisation of 
the EU. Former Czech Prime Minister Petr Neĉas, who was under significant pressure 
from the Eurosceptic Czech president Václav Klaus not to sign the treaty in 2011, 
defended his decision to opt out by arguing that the treaty expanded policy cooperation 
beyond the desired focus on internal market liberalisation. Like David Cameron, Neĉas 
argued that his opt out represented the new reality of differentiated integration in the 
EU, where individual member states would want to choose in which policy areas they 
are willing to agree to deeper cooperation (Neĉas 2012). David Cameron spoke of the 
need to protect Britain from the vision of ‘ever closer union’ which the member states of 
the eurozone wanted to pursue and which was not the same flexible agenda he would 
like to see being implemented in the EU: ‘This vision of flexibility and co-operation is 
not the same as those who want to build an ever closer political union – but it is just as 
valid.’ (Cameron 2013).  
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The treaty therefore represents a crucial cornerstone for the EU whose leaders are 
currently unsure about which direction its future development should take. The Fiscal 
Compact reflects a definite chance towards differentiated integration between the 
eurozone core group and the periphery. The current division between a semi-periphery 
group of predominantly aspiring eurozone members and the relatively small outer 
periphery, which at present is represented only by the UK and the Czech Republic is 
likely to be only a temporary setup. Even if the eurozone core remains open towards 
horizontal expansion it is certain that not all countries who are at present on the outside 
will eventually want to join. More sceptical countries such as the Sweden, Denmark, the 
Czech Republic and most of all the United Kingdom are likely to reject eurozone entry 
on the basis that is would significantly constrain their national policy autonomy. The 
essential core-periphery division between the eurozone and the outsiders is therefore 
likely to remain in the future, even though existing member states will make attempts to 
avoid a horizontal encapsulation of the euro core. The level of horizontal encapsulation 
inside the eurozone will substantially depend on to what extent the new policy 
mechanisms are equipped to once again create the perception of what Schmitter has 
called 'equitable returns', i.e. beneficial outcomes from monetary integration in the form 
of boosting economic growth and supporting competitiveness. If the latter occur on the 
basis of the limited policy coordination adopted under the new mechanisms the 
willingness to move towards deeper policy coordination in further areas is likely to 
wane amongst eurozone. Renewed horizontal encapsulation of the new status quo or at 
best limited change by granting 'central decisionmakers with more resources or 
authority to redistribute returns' (Schmitter 1970: 858) is therefore a realistic prospect 
under conditions of medium-term recovery of the eurozone from the sovereign debt 
crisis. Support for a political federalisation of the eurozone remains limited, even 
amongst the central players France and Germany. Many other countries in the eurozone 
show an increasingly sceptical attitude towards what the perceive as a German attempt 
to narrow the purpose of the eurozone to that of a fiscal austerity union (Lane 2012, p. 
64). This perception of the future of the EU being determined on the basis of German 
economic hegemony (Bulmer and Paterson 2013, p. 1388) is likely to be a substantial 
factor which will keep the EU on the path towards increasingly differentiated 
integration. Even in the current Euro Plus Pact group countries like Denmark and 
Hungary remain sceptical of the emerging policy framework (Schweiger 2013). For the 
foreseeable future the EU is therefore likely to waver between the option of 
encapsulation in a dichotomy between the eurozone core and the external periphery on 
the one hand and a more transparent differentiated integration between the now 28 
membership base on the other hand.  An increasingly differentiated encapsulation 
between multiple groupings of member states currently looks like the most likely and 
viable option to accommodate the increasing variety of national economic and political 
interests in the EU-28. The Fiscal Compact has created a flexible framework for the 
eurozone and rest of the EU to determine the right balance between encapsulation and 
further selective spillover. 
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